Durkheim
(¡®On Suicide¡¯)
Introduction:
¡®mimesis¡¯/¡¯recognition¡¯. The crisis of self-image or self-identity, is often characterized
as ¡®mimetic¡¯ (when it is the ¡®other¡¯s¡¯ view that is copied, even where no such
view exists¡) or as ¡®recognition¡¯ (when denied by real or imaginary others, the
¡®significant¡¯ others of group identification, so, in ones¡¯ mind, denied by self¡
denied self¡). Furthermore, the picturing of self (the mimesis, or recognition)
is imaginary and so often does not accord with social economic position as in
fact or as desired or feared¡ This imaginary construct may then be challenged
by events in reality and the perceived challenge reacted against in a variety
of ways. Theories of mimetic exchange begin here, with self-image as related to
others, as a copy¡ (Girard). But we must know who to copy¡and when¡ However, ¡®mimesis¡¯
is a dead end in Girard¡¯s take on sacrifice, not only because inadequately
situated in an overall theory of identity, but mainly not being able to explain
adequately its major designated aims - the variety of sacrificial violence (Durkheim
too has this problem, from ¡®On Suicide¡¯, to the more comprehensive, ¡®The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life¡¯). The issue is that the same model must be
able to explain the varieties of identity crisis, the categories of suicide as described
by Durkheim and the violence of Girard¡¯s notion of ¡®sacrificial crisis¡¯, as well
as the modalities of ¡®the gift¡¯ and its relation to ritual through to the
pogrom, mass terror and the suicide bomber. If we take the path of ¡®recognition¡¯,
rather than ¡®mimesis¡¯, as key category then we are lead
to the concept of ¡®identity exchange¡¯ as key to conceptualizing the gift or sacrificial
relation. Indeed, ¡®mimesis¡¯ needs to be linked, via (self-)recognition, to the theory
of identity exchange in order to work (that is, it cannot function as a primary
concept or foundation). Recognition requires no copying: only assertion (so a
failed copy or assertion would have the same result). When we imagine ones¡¯
self as we would like others to see one ¨C then there is no problem (until, if
the balloon was over- inflated, it bursts¡). When one imagines ones¡¯ self as
one fears others see one, as one would see, and judge ones¡¯ self (if one was
another) then a crisis is evoked¡ The turning of the energies released,
individually or collectively, back on the self or onto the other, are the topic
of this reconsideration of Emile Durkheim¡¯s categories from ¡®On Suicide¡¯ (a
reconsideration which I believe is implied by the development of these ideas in
¡®The Elementary Forms of Religious Life¡¯).
There
are three kinds of suicide in Durkheim¡¯s conception: ¡®ego¡¯; ¡®anomie¡¯; ¡®altruistic¡¯
(actually, four, but the fourth is less based upon identity and its
vicissitudes rather than the sense -and fact- of physical or social
incarceration). These three types may be linked to three kinds of situation, or
mode of identification with others¡ respectively: membership; position; role - so
all basically variations on one theme. I would suggest the order of relation as:
¡®group¡¯ (membership), ¡®position¡¯ (in group), ¡®role¡¯ (as key to position or
membership of group) as the best way of relating the three¡ Otherwise, in each
one self-image and relation to others, ¡®(self)recognition¡¯, all play the fundamentally
same basic constitutional and crisis-prone role. I will explain why I exchange
two of Durkheim¡¯s terms (¡®ego¡¯ and ¡®anomie¡¯) below.
Durkheim
first dismisses the purely economic level, or the struggle for survival as
consistent hardship as a key variable (otherwise the further back in history we
go, and the further down the social ladder we go, the more suicide we would
find as the conditions of life worsen). Although a change down often is¡(this is the difference of given situation and the ¡®change
down¡¯ of a situation). Moreover, we might note that the Romans accepted suicide
as right and proper for the highest level of citizen, when faced with a fall, a
loss of face, or just a decline in powers due to aging.
It
seems ¡®face¡¯, ¡®honour¡¯, social or peer group standing,
ones¡¯ adequacy before ones¡¯ ego ideal (real or imaginary) provide the key; a
matter of our ¡®recognition organ¡¯, ¡®evolved¡¯ throughout our life, the history
of our interaction with others, from (M)Other onwards; it is our sense of self
as interpersonal that is in play - and it is not happy.
Face
or honour, identity or recognition, social position
or belonging, map out in three forms: (i) the desire
for sacrifice for the group, the desire for a role, so realizing training and
ambition¡ (¡®altruistic¡¯); (ii) the loss of membership of the group (real or
imaginary) Durkheim uses ¡®ego¡¯ but it would perhaps be better to use ¡®anomie¡¯,
as the later has come to be read as meaning the more general condition of lack
of belonging; (iii) a loss of position (nominated ¡®anomie¡¯ by Durkheim), but I
would suggest that it is better to use ¡®ego¡¯ as operating in relation to other
egos, our peers on the minuscule gradations of the ladder of distinction and
differentiation. All three involve groups as key background or larger set, with
(ii) superimposing grade or position, on membership (i),
with (iii) as a special case of ambition or need for a ¡®special¡¯ role¡ within the
group, and as part of the war of position, as the key to recognition.
Summary:
Group Position Role
Anomie Ego Altruistic
Or: loss
of membership, loss of position, loss of role.
So recognition (¡®mimesis¡¯
in other models, ones¡¯ self-image as others might see one) is seen as the key
factor (belonging and being seen to belong and feeling as belonging in ones¡¯
rightful place¡). With loss also as the key, crisis inspiring, common factor
(whether by a change brought about in actuality or by fear ¨C an imaginary
event). Gradations range from: (a) (loss of) basic belonging, the basic desire
to belong ¨C whose general absence is now usually described as ¡®anomie¡¯ (part loses
whole)) the key role of identification and acceptance, real or imaginary, to
human identity (recognition in general); to (b) (loss of) position within the group,
resulting in a ¡®blow to ones ego¡¯ , (Durkheim¡¯s ¡®anomie¡¯, Hobbes¡¯ ¡®distinction¡¯,
hierarchy-seeking desire of identity) self and important others¡ (recognition
as particular position) the desired position not gained or worse lost (part is
devalued within the whole); with (c) as either a special form of a desired position
which has been sensed as forever lost or foreclosed: or, more deeply, (c) as
the desire for self-sacrifice, glory, or less dramatically, service and
recognition due¡ (Even if only by the self? Sometimes initially. Then usually
public, and/or peer recognition is desired¡). So (c) is a case of a loss of
role as yet unattained. We might further note the temporalities involved: the latter
is future-based (intention/subjunctive wish/will); the other two are past-based,
a case of previous (or previously imagined) position lost¡ A mixed case may be
found in a desired position never attained (marriage), also future-based but not
quite the same as the desire for self-sacrifice not attained. A temporal
distinction which crosses the distinction between, the role desired and that
role as self-sacrifice, as giving the ultimate meaning of a life, as giving the
ultimate meaning to life¡ This later also has the ¡®rhetoric of eternity¡¯ in the
background as the reference to first and last things¡ as in belief and religious
systems¡ a role including death as necessary. So, from basic belonging and
position, we move to special duty, a heroic role as extra-distinction
(extra-position), as ultimate recognition (self and others) the ultimate form
of giving (self-sacrifice).
Regarding
the loss of actual group or position (past to present), this loss is more
likely to present a crisis, than the loss of un-attained membership or position
(present to future). With respect to this latter case (but also in the case of
the first two cases of loss), suicide as a response to the lack of role may
take the form of addiction, or alcoholism or indirect death, all the way to direct
death as part of the said role (mercenaries, causes, terrorism) and so finally
to suicide, with death as a key aspect of the role (suicide bombers). Loss due
to the past position fallen, and the inability to envisage a way to ones¡¯
desired future may anyway combine to provoke a suicidal or destructive motion (individually
or collectively, from narcotics or other ¡®passive¡¯ forms of self-destruction,
to scapegoating or rioting, to politics or war).
Identity
exchange is a crucial part of the recognition process (and the mimetic nexus). Rituals
which fill the gaps, and repair the work of loss and entropy through a network
of ritual ¡®loss¡¯, sacrifice, destruction, up to self-destruction (¡®altruistic¡¯,
suicide bombers). An exchange is made in identity such that materiality and
time are exchanged for self-image or identity and belonging or recognition; from
handshake to festival a continuum of identity exchange underpins our
connections to others; in effect matter and time are exchanged for spirit (¡®disjunctive
reciprocity¡¯). Ritual bridges the metaphysical divide of things and ideas,
spirit and matter, material and spiritual culture, body and mind. Either the rituals
are fixed as in traditional societies or become a less visible part of the mass
commodity market or modern societies, as gift and commodity merge (the exchange
value is material, the use value is ¡®spiritual¡¯, identity based, whatever the
ostensible function of the commodity bought). These provide the individual supports
for identity and its needs in modern societies. National rituals and national
identity (the new ¡®metaset of belonging¡¯) evolve to replace and complement
older, collective, religious ritual and identity in mass market capitalist
societies (¡®modernity¡¯). These all provide the ritual glue with degrees of what
is ¡®payed for¡¯ to ¡®belong¡¯, to obtain that key sense
of belonging¡ So in reverse order, in the ¡®fame¡¯, ¡®glory¡¯,
¡¯altruistic¡¯ category, the exchange is clear; of self, offered up in total. In
the ¡®position¡¯ category (Durkheim¡¯s ¡®anomie¡¯, for which I have suggested ¡®ego¡¯)
an exchange of time for training as for goods and services (¡®favours¡¯) offered for post or position ¨C with peer-related
sacrifices, activities (marriage). In the ¡®group¡¯ category (Durkheim¡¯s ¡®ego¡¯, but
I suggest it would be more precise to use the more general term, ¡®anomie¡¯)
similarly, an exchange of time, for training (if appropriate) or time for
meetings, reunions, religious observance, rituals, and so offerings of goods
and services (¡®presents¡¯, favours, etc.). Note how
people ¡®buy back¡¯ their connection, their position or group belonging, after a
loss of face (or honour, or ¡®cred¡¯, esteem, fame or
celebrity). Or repair the entropy of being absent from family and friends for
some time¡ In many cases the suicide has already lost these connections or
cannot repair them¡ or they may be irreparable (criminal disgrace,
socio-economic fall, divorce), and require a drastic life change as a solution
(people move, change their job, get divorced, get re-educated, or get religion¡).
This article is concerned with the coherence of
conceptualization ¨C the application of Durkheim¡¯s ideas and pre-conceptions on
suicide to statistics and society (modernity, women, attempted suicide, post-industrialisation, etc.) is another issue.
Copyright Peter Nesteruk, 2018